ITT I ask libfags questions

1) Is it wrong to discriminate against certain groups, on the sole basis of skin colour (and not race), by cognitive ability? Please explain why your position position is backed by science. Refrain from answering unless you have a minimal understanding of statistics, please.

Moar questions to follow later, because I feel I'm going to have to deal with a lot of morons with this simple one.

The answer is wrong. It is treating people unfairly. That is why it is wrong. Morality is not backed by science. /topic

>>2
Wow. If you said just:
The answer is wrong.
I would have replied exactly:
Morality is not backed by science.
Of course, adding that morality is subject to change and that it's completely worthless in assessing a REAL situation. I can have Christfags denying (->human) macroevolution because they actually think that after it refutes the Christian narrative, without the concept of God there'd be no morality. And I can have libfags deny human microevolution because acknowledging human ecological differences would call for a saner public policy and their removal from the Matrix. (What I'm bewildered is that you still use evolution to annoy Christfags.) Anyway, my point is, if I ask a Christfag 'Is it wrong to believe in evolution?' I'm not asking about his moral stance on it, I'm asking if he believes it to be correct or not. And in Christfag morality, evolution might as well be morally wrong. So who cares about morality?
tl;dr, fuck off with your morality and your leftist religion, it's YOUR delusion, not mine.

Anyway, back to my question. I sought an answer: if libfags believe that I am SCIENTIFICALLY (or should I say mathematically) correct to discriminate (=differentiate) against GROUPS, on the basis of merely SKIN COLOUR, by COGNITIVE ABILITY or NOT?

I'm asking this because, when I point out that racial differences exist to members of the Church of the Left (but not limited to), they usually mumble something about "skin colour," which is a monumentally ignorant and stupid straw man. So I'm playing ball.

I already know about your sick, destructive morality. Now, try to answer my question. ;)

>>3
You asked the question about a certain action. You did not ask any whether something was true or not true, or whether the action is good or not. You were asking a question about whether it is wrong or not i. e. its morality. Asking a question about morality and then denying that you did not ask such a question is FAIL.

>>1
Race thread+libfag = "I have lost myself on the way to /pol/, please help me go back to it"

>>4
You asked the question about a certain action. You did not ask any whether something was true or not true, or whether the action is good or not. You were asking a question about whether it is wrong or not i. e. its morality. Asking a question about morality and then denying that you did not ask such a question is FAIL.
Funny. Yes, 'wrong' can mean different things in law, ethics, science... However, and I quote myself from OP text,
Please explain why your position position is backed by science.
So I kind of put the context in. Then I said:
Refrain from answering unless you have a minimal understanding of statistics, please.
Which also corroborates my question being of a scientific nature. I can't think of an use of statistics in morality, but I admit I'm not even trying.

Then I restated my question in >>3 because at least one libfag has very hard problems understanding that -- go figure -- I ALREADY KNOW their twisted moral stance on the issue.

For some reason, you forgot to answer the restated question in >>3. I'm sure you've just overlooked it by accident.

In b4 not a straight answer and more semantics.

>>5
You're right, I should spam them to go to this thread. But I asked here because I'd get less idiots epicfailing at statistics.
If you are a libfag/egalitarian, your input is welcome.

>>6
FAIL again. What "wrong" means is more determined by syntactical considerations rather than contextual considerations. For one thing, it could mean "unethical." Actions can be unethical. It can also mean "incorrect." Only propositions can be true or false. Actions cannot be true or false. "[T]o discriminate against certain groups" IS AN ACTION. To specify that it be backed by science or statistics as if it were a true/false statement only renders your request illogical. FAIL again.

>>6
MOREOVER, you cannot expect anything other than semantics if you cannot even tell what you are asking correctly. The words "true/false" apply only to propositions, and not anything else. If you are going to say, "is this door wrong?" you cannot expect any answer because people do not know your question. As I've said, FAIL.

>>8-9
FAIL again.
Nope, I was quite right:
In b4 not a straight answer and more semantics.
Now...
For one thing, it could mean "unethical." Actions can be unethical. It can also mean "incorrect."
And to confuse the matters more, unethical and incorrect are also interchangeable.
http://www.answers.com/wrong?cat=biz-fin
   1.  Not in conformity with fact or truth; incorrect or erroneous.
   2.
         1. Contrary to conscience, morality, or law; immoral or wicked.
         2. Unfair; unjust.
   3. Not required, intended, or wanted: took a wrong turn.
   4. Not fitting or suitable; inappropriate or improper: said the wrong thing.
   5. Not in accord with established usage, method, or procedure: the wrong way to shuck clams.
   6. Not functioning properly; out of order.
   7. Unacceptable or undesirable according to social convention.
   8. Designating the side, as of a garment, that is less finished and not intended to show: socks worn wrong side out.

Fail moar, libfag.
 
Only propositions can be true or false. Actions cannot be true or false.
They can. For example, the 9/11 troof thesis is false. Enjoy semantics.
As for what I said, this has NOTHING to do with 'true/false' in the way I phrased it.
"[T]o discriminate against certain groups" IS AN ACTION.
It means 'to differentiate.'
http://www.answers.com/discriminate
v.intr.

   1.
         1. To make a clear distinction; distinguish: discriminate among the options available.
         2. To make sensible decisions; judge wisely.
   2. To make distinctions on the basis of class or category without regard to individual merit; show preference or prejudice: was accused of discriminating against women; discriminated in favor of his cronies.

v.tr.

   1. To perceive the distinguishing features of; recognize as distinct: discriminate right from wrong.
   2. To distinguish by noting differences; differentiate: unable to discriminate colors.
   3. To make or constitute a distinction in or between: methods that discriminate science from pseudoscience.

I'm not here to give you fucking English lessons. You know what I meant, and I've rephrased and restated it for your convenience in other posts.

>>9
>MOREOVER, you cannot expect anything other than semantics if you cannot even tell what you are asking correctly.
I know I cannot expect much more from you other than semantics. Hopefully someone else, with whom I can actually communicate, will join the discussion.
>The words "true/false" apply only to propositions, and not anything else.
The words true/false are only in your head. You're the only one repeating them. Putting words in my mouth, typical libfag debate tactic
If you are going to say, "is this door wrong?" you cannot expect any answer because people do not know your question. As I've said, FAIL.
I fucking asked, to sum it up: 'is the METHOD wrong?' which is as CORRECT as it can be.

In before moar semantics and dodging the issue. Fine, if you don't understand the question, you're not worth talking to. Fuck off then.

>is the METHOD wrong?
What is the method for? The method is perfectly right if you want to discriminate people. It is perfectly wrong if you want not to discriminate people. It depends on the purpose.

On average some ethnicities are smarter, faster, bigger, exc, but its not true for all people of that ethnic descent. On average asians are shorter than those of european decent, but are all asians shorter?

>11
What is the method for? The method is perfectly right if you want to discriminate people. It is perfectly wrong if you want not to discriminate people. It depends on the purpose.
Statements like yours are the reason why I asked libfags to have a minimal understanding of statistics (or plain logic).
I'm at least glad that you apparently acknowledged I worded it correctly.
>>12
On average some ethnicities
(Some) libfags told me ethnicities amount to skin colour. Now I'm asking them the question in OP, irrelevant to ethnicities. Or, in case your brain is fossilised like the other libfag, try the one in >>3.
are smarter, faster, bigger, exc, but its not true for all people of that ethnic descent.
My request for a minimal understanding of statistics is still on ;_;. I'm talking about groups not individuals, so your pointing that out is worthless.
On average asians are shorter than those of european decent, but are all asians shorter?
No. And this is something I'll get to discussing after someone fucking answers the question.

Moreover, despite your being off-topic, why are you talking about individuals? Libfags do not treat people as individuals, so their bringing individuals to the equation is hypocritical at best (since you appealed to emotion and nothing else with mentioning individuals).

tl;dr answer the question, and in before more swerving around. ;_;

Forgot to sign my name in >>13 and if requested, I will rephrase and explain the question even better and more specific to my point so libfags won't have to know anything about statistics, but it's obvious enough as it is.

Listen, I've been told by numerous libfags when bringing up race and intelligence that I shouldn't judge people by their skin colour (a perfectly stupid straw man), not only because it is morally bad, but also scientifically incorrect (i.e. I cannot ecologically link skin colour to cognitive ability, because that apparently 'doesn't make sense' to members of the Church of the Left). So now that I'm playing ball and going with the skin colour straw man, the few libfags here don't want to play any more and commence in straw man?

tl;dr You smug retards have, as a group, constantly portrayed yourselves as having science on your side on every single matter of policy. WHERE IS YOUR MARX NOW?

I meant,
commence in another straw man?

>>13
If you want your standard shit "the average difference between the means of the races is vastly lower than their standard deviations and are all normally distributed so that their differences are negligible" then there you go. /thread

tl;dr You smug retards have, as a group, constantly portrayed yourselves as having science on your side on every single matter of policy. WHERE IS YOUR MARX NOW?
grrr grrr
OP you're asking imprecise questions and then getting angry about it.

Science can't be used to justify racism, is that what you're going for?

>>16
Actually, I'd prefer something that is true, thanks. This non-truth, however, has nothing to do with what I'm asking. Maybe when I state my later questions I'll discuss this specific fallacy.
>>17
OP you're asking imprecise questions and then getting angry about it.
My question is very precise, and only completely ignorant rubes would have a problem understanding it.
Listen, I've been told by numerous libfags [...] that I shouldn't judge groups by their skin colour [...] but also scientifically incorrect (i.e. I cannot ecologically link skin colour to cognitive ability [...])
So, leftists believe that
I cannot ecologically link skin colour to cognitive ability
That would mean, for me to be inaccurate, that the ecological correlate (Read http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecological_correlation if you are completely clueless) would be hovering around zero (an ecological correlation can be positive or negative too).
(Some) libfags play on human emotions when they say I scientifically can't judge groups by 'merely' skin colour. Now I'm asking libfags to restate their position, because they're the Enlightened Ones, with 'science on their side.'
Science can't be used to justify racism,
Yes it can, and very much so, but I'll get to that later (if I won't die of boredom sooner trying to get straight answer from libfags).
is that what you're going for?
Not really, at the moment I want an answer to a simple question.
Example of what I thought libfags, in their religiosity and delusion, would reply:
Yes, I think it is [scientifically] wrong to discriminate against certain groups, on the sole basis of skin colour (and not race), by cognitive ability. No, I don't know how/why my position is backed by science, but I think it is.
It seems you aren't even brave enough to do that, and IT'S JUST A FUCKING QUESTION.

>>18
The fact is quite simply that the words "true/false" and "ethical/unethical" and "good/bad" are not interchangeable. The words "right/wrong" can mean either of the three things, and what they mean is designated by what they describe. They can describe three things. If it is any phenomenon, then it would be disambiguated as being "ethical/unethical" or "good/bad." If it is a proposition, then it is "correct/incorrect."

You claim that "9/11 troof thesis" is not a proposition. Theses are propositions. There are many other words that mean propositions and perhaps you may not have realized that "thesis" is just another kind of proposition, as are "theory," "idea," and many other words.

Since "discrimination against persons" is not a proposition, you must mean either "good/bad" and "ethical/unethical." You affirmed this when you said, "[a]s for what I said, this has NOTHING to do with 'true/false' in the way I phrased it." This implies that right/wrong does not mean true/false, but rather something else.

Right/wrong automatically implies that ethical/unethical. Claiming that you asked a question on ethics and then denying it is automatically FAIL. Try asking a question properly next time rather than being illogical.

You have several ambiguous propositions in your question. Is it
1. Is it true or false that it is unethical to discriminate against groups of people?
2. Is it true or false that discrimination against groups of people is a bad thing?

You seem to be asking the latter question. However, you should be aware that value statements like good/bad depend on the purpose and perspective. There is most likely no universal value, so attempts to make value statements like good/bad without first specifying a perspective is going to result in FAIL.

FURTHERMORE, there are various value systems. You seem to be asking a question evaluating the value of discrimination. However, you should realize that there are many value systems and perspectives. I shall give you some examples. This is taken from some stupid website which attempts to philosophize (but I doubt that this person knows any philosophy at all). However, in this website is a convenient list of value systems: http://humanknowledge.net/Thoughts.html

1. PIETISM is the thesis that the ultimate value is devotion to supernatural agency.
2. COLLECTIVISM is the thesis that the ultimate value is the good of persons in groups.
3. INDIVIDUALISM is the thesis that the ultimate value is the good of persons as individuals.
4. EUDAIMONISM is the thesis that ultimate value lies in individual happiness.
5. UTILITARIANISM is the thesis that the ultimate value is the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
6. HEDONISM is the thesis that the ultimate value is pleasure.
7. ASCETICISM is the thesis that the ultimate value is serenity.
8. EGOISM is the thesis that the ultimate value is one's own happiness.
9. STOICISM is the thesis that the ultimate value is virtue.
10. EXISTENTIALISM is the thesis that ultimate values are created only by individual choices.
11. SURVIVALISM is the thesis that the ultimate value is inclusive reproductive fitness.
12. PESSIMISM is the thesis that values are irrelevant.
13. NIHILISM is the thesis that everything is irrelevant.
14. DEONTOLOGISM is the thesis that ultimate value derives from rational imperative.
15. ALTRUISM is the thesis that the ultimate value is the happiness of others.
16. EXTROPIANISM is the thesis that the ultimate value is extropy.

Take your pick. What do you mean by "wrong"? Is it wrong for pietism, collectivism, individualism, eudaimonism, utilitarianism, hedonism, asceticism, egoism, stoicism, existentialism, survivalism, pessimism, nihilism, deontologism, altruism, extropianism, or any other value system not here named? If you are asking for nihilism, then my answer is that it is not relevant. Obviously the world is meaningless so why would it matter if people were discriminated or not.

Of course your question is imprecise, you're asking if it's okay to discriminate but not in what way.

Yes it can, and very much so, but I'll get to that later (if I won't die of boredom sooner trying to get straight answer from libfags).
Ho-ho the beast reveals itself, escaped from stormfront have we.

You say that your question is precise. This is obviously WRONG.

There are several ambiguities to your question.
It is a question about ETHICS (which you denied). OR
It is a question about VALUE (however, you have not specified a value system).

If it is a question about VALUE, there are several value systems. I still do not know what value system you speak of.
It is a question about whether it is EASY to do or not (HEDONISM). OR
It is a question about whether it results in higher intelligence/extropy (EXTROPIANISM). OR
It is a question about whether it is good for people's feelings or not (EUDAIMONISM). OR
It is a question about whether it is good for the survival of society (SURVIVALISM). OR
It is a question about whether it is effective or not for choosing people of higher intelligence (UTILITARIANISM).

OR ANY OTHER VALUE SYSTEM. I still do not know which one.

The two final disambiguations are slightly more complicated, but the first falls into the first category, ETHICS, whereas the second is a question about NATURE. This is what you get from asking an ambiguous and imprecise question. You will have to choose which question you are asking.

Are people obligated to do this in service for society? (See: http://www.iep.utm.edu/c/collecti.htm)
Is it the thing people would rather do? (See: A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume)

>>19,20,22
What medication will you get tonight in the mental house? Perhaps you should type after receiving the medication. If you are still allowed to sit at the computer.
>>21
Of course your question is imprecise, you're asking if it's okay to discriminate but not in what way.
I just explained in the post you're quoting and in every other post. Skin colour and cognitive ability. What the fuck do you mean, in what way?
Ho-ho the beast reveals itself, escaped from stormfront have we.
And then the imagination runs wild to avoid answering a simple question. Yes.

>>24
The Failure of Utilitarian Ethics in Political Economy

I. Introduction

A normative argument must have a normative premise whether it is explicitly stated or not. As Gordon Clark pointed out in one of his philosophic essays, it is simply not possible to logically arrive at the conclusion that people ought to behave in some specified way simply because someone prefers it that way.[1] The most popular ethical philosophy to employ with respect to issues of ethical behavior at the current time appears to be utilitarianism. Yet, most people use this approach almost by default and rarely, if ever, explicitly acknowledge that such a point of reference is inherent in the arguments that they make. The result is that public policy debates are often carried on without ever acknowledging the inherent flaws in the underlying ethical theory that resides behind the scene.

Indeed, the widespread confusion over this point is one of the primary reasons why western market economies have continued to drift towards the ready acceptance of socialist policies. Edmund Opitz has rightly observed that utilitarianism with its “greatest happiness principle” completely neglects the spiritual dimension of human life. Rather, it simply “asserts that men are bound together in societies solely on the basis of a rational calculation of the private advantage to be gained by social cooperation under the division of labor.”[2] But, as Opitz shows, this perspective gives rise to a serious problem. Since theft is the first labor saving device, the utilitarian principle will tend to lead to the collective use of government power so as to redistribute income in order to gain the “greatest happiness” in society. Regrettably, the rent seeking behavior that is spawned as a result of this mind set will prove detrimental to the economy. Nevertheless, this kind of action will be justified as that which is most socially expedient in order to reach the assumed ethical end. “Utilitarianism, in short, has no logical stopping place short of collectivism.”[3] If morality is ultimately had by making the individual’s happiness subservient to the organic whole of society, which is what Bentham’s utilitarianism asserts, then the human rights of the individual may be violated. That means property rights may be violated if it is assumed to promote the utilitarian end. However, property rights are essential in securing a free market order. As a result, utilitarianism can then be used to justify some heinous government actions. For instance, the murder of millions of human beings can be justified in the minds of reformers if it is thought to move us closer to paradise on earth. This is precisely the view that was taken by communist revolutionaries as they implemented their grand schemes of remaking society. All of this is not to say that matters of utility are unimportant in policy decisions, but merely to assert that utilitarian ethics will have the tendency of promoting collectivist policies. This will tend to hold true in most cases except when such collectivism has so thoroughly destroyed the economic enterprise as in the case of the former Soviet Union. In those cases, the very real need of material advancement will lead to reform in the other direction.

Therein lies the problem. Is the end that utilitarianism aims for truly ethical? It certainly contradicts the traditional moral philosophies. Both the older natural law philosophies as well as those founded upon religious traditions take issue with the use of force so as to gain one’s material wherewithal. If it can be shown that utilitarianism suffers logically from several fatal flaws, then the rational thing that one ought to do is to reject it as a basis for making ethical judgments in policy debates in favor of a more substantive moral philosophy of life. This is the purpose of this paper. Namely, to point out the numerous shortcomings of utilitarianism. In addition, it will be worthwhile to examine a common policy issue in order to demonstrate the difference that it makes when traditional moral philosophies are employed as the foundation upon which one either approves of or disapproves of a particular government action. In this case, an examination of the debate over the delivery of public goods will prove useful.

II The Inherent Flaws of Utilitarianism

As is well known, Jeremy Bentham is credited as the person responsible for developing and initially promoting utilitarianism. Bentham’s philosophy employs the notions of utility and hedonism in such a way as to provide a new foundation for making ethical judgments. Of course the ideas of utility and of hedonism were already present long before Bentham lived on this earth. To be sure, the concept of utility will always be fundamental to any consistent study of economics. Yet, his assertion that ethical behavior essentially culminates in the promotion of “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” of people in society was new and it departed radically from traditional ethical philosophies. As Frederick Copleston has written, “Bentham did not invent the principle of utility: what he did was to expound and apply it explicitly and universally as the basic principle of both morals and legislation.”[4] In this regard, Bentham was acting as a social reformer who sought to change the world. He vigorously attacked traditional morality and rejected notions of both the natural law and of natural human rights.

Instead of approaching ethical philosophy in its traditional way, Bentham rested his theory solely upon the concept of psychological hedonism. That is, he used the observation from utility analysis that people seek pleasure and avoid pain as the basis upon which to devise a new moral standard of behavior. In essence, Bentham sought to make evil synonymous with pain and to make virtue synonymous with pleasure. This was his main point of departure from traditional ethics. Traditional moral philosophies tend to assert that virtuous actions will ultimately result in pleasure while evil actions will ultimately result in pain. But in traditional morality these things are never paired together as if they were one and the same thing. Rather, they exist together as causal pairs. The work of Jonathan Edwards provides an excellent example of this approach. Throughout his philosophical and theological writings, Edwards argued that a person ought to set his highest affections on God alone. In fact, Edwards argued that the benevolent love of God was the only true virtue. From this position, he proceeded to argue that such affection would move the person to live a moral life in conformity to the commandments of God given in the Bible. In turn, living such a life would result in the greatest possible eternal reward and would result, therefore, in the greatest possible utility for the person. This traditional approach to moral philosophy is readily espoused throughout the Bible as well. For instance, in his discussion of Moses’ faith in Christ, the writer of Hebrews says:

By faith Moses, when he became of age, refused to be called the son of Pharaoh’s daughter, choosing rather to suffer affliction with the people of God than to enjoy the passing pleasures of sin, esteeming the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures in Egypt; for he looked to the reward.[5]

The point of the passage indicates that virtuous behavior is sometimes costly and painful in the short term, but exceedingly beneficial in the long term. In fact, the traditional notion of wisdom is that the wise man is the one who prudently endures some immediate pain for a greater good. The main point of this is that Jonathan Edwards and the biblical writers never confused a person’s pleasure with virtuous behavior itself, but rather saw it as a by-product of a life well-lived. Nevertheless, Bentham simply asserted that they are one and the same thing, and on this basis attempted to construct a new kind of moral guide. However, his effort suffers from several underlying flaws which render it useless in serving as an ultimate compass of what people ought to do.

A. The Problem of Making Interpersonal Comparisons

Among the many difficulties encountered in Bentham?s approach, the first is that it is impossible to make interpersonal comparisons. It is a well-known fact that different people have different tastes. In addition, there are differences in personalities and talents that different people possess and these differences give rise to differences in their goals and ambitions. All these variations in turn give rise to a fundamental fact of human existence. Namely, that it is impossible for us to know or measure the extent of either pleasure or pain for any specific person in any particular situation. Such measures are beyond the capacity of our ability to know. While human beings can most certainly empathize with someone who is experiencing extreme hardship or enjoying great success, such efforts are only accomplished by projecting one’s own inward feelings to someone else’s circumstance. One person simply cannot accurately know the depth of another person’s pain nor the height of his joy.

While Bentham at least recognized this problem, it did not discourage him from his ultimate pursuit. Instead, he continued to promote his new ethical philosophy and argued that it was the only way that we could go. Therefore, he pressed for a way to measure happiness. While he was never able to arrive at such a measure, he remained confident that one would soon be developed and even used the term utils as the units in which it would be measured. Economists have long since given up on the search for a cardinal measure of utility. Strangely enough however, welfare economists continue to act as if we can actually accomplish the impossible task by attempting to measure deadweight losses within the context of modern price theory. It is the rise in the prominence of welfare analysis that has given utilitarianism a standing in modern policy debates. However, such efforts cannot escape the reality that such measures cannot be made. With no adequate way to measure utility in order to make the necessary interpersonal comparisons, all such policy arguments are reduced to contests where each side claims that the rewards to be received by them would greatly outweigh whatever pain might be incurred by those who are forced to bear the costs.

B. An Inadequate Conception of Human Nature

Another problem with utilitarianism is that it has a very narrow conception of what it means to be a human being. Within Bentham’s view, human beings are essentially understood to be passive creatures who respond to the environment in a purely mechanical fashion. As such, there are no “bad” motives, only “bad” calculations. In these terms, no person is responsible for his or her own behavior. In effect, the idea being promoted is that human action is essentially the same as that of a machine in operation. This notion reduces a human thought to nothing more than a series of bio-chemical reactions. Yet, if this is true, then there is no meaning to human thought or human action and all human reason is reduced to the point of being meaningless.[6]

Beyond this problem, it also seems a little absurd to argue that since all human beings seek pleasure and avoid pain, that we can conclude that such a fact ought then be used as the foundation upon which an ethical theory ought to be constructed. As Opitz points out,

Words like pleasure happiness, or satisfaction are what might be called “container words.” They are words needing a content, like the word “assistant.” When someone tells you he is an assistant, you are told nothing about his actual job. All you know is that he is not an executive. To make it specific, the job of being an assistant needs some entity to hook up with. Similarly, happiness or pleasure. There is no such entity as pleasure or happiness; these are mental states which may be associated with many different things.[7]

Since this is true, pleasure cannot be the goal of human action in and of itself. It is simply the by-product of human action which is actually aimed at the attainment of some specific goal or end. To be sure, people rarely seek to refine their tastes by considering such qualitative issues until they are well fed, clothed, and housed, but that fact does not mean that such issues are unimportant. Even that great proponent of utilitarianism, J. S. Mill, came to understand this point. As a result, he too began to recognize that happiness was not something that could be had directly and tried to introduce qualitative factors into his utilitarianism.

Regrettably, Mill did not press the implication of this insight to its final conclusion. If he had, he would have abandoned his utilitarianism in favor of some other ethical philosophy. The reason why this is so is that an effort to include qualitative factors into one’s ethical thinking necessarily requires an appeal to some ideal. That is, Mill must have in mind some concept or idea of what human beings ought to be, rather than what they in fact are, if he is going to include qualitative factors in his analysis. When this is done, one is forced back into the mode of the traditional ethical philosophies that existed prior to the utilitarian project. If one has an ideal of what men should be, then that ideal establishes a standard of moral behavior apart from the pursuit of pleasure itself. As Copleston comments on the matter:

Hence there must be a standard of excellence; and this is not fully worked out. The relevant point in the present context, however, is not Mill’s failure to elaborate a theory of human nature. Rather is it the fact that he grafts on to Benthamism a moral theory which has little or nothing to do with balancing of pleasures and pains according to the hedonistic calculus of Bentham, and that he does not see the necessity of subjecting his original starting-point to a thorough criticism and revision.[8]

C. The Fallacy of Composition

A final problem with utilitarianism that ought to be mentioned is that it is subject to being criticized because of a potential fallacy of composition. The common good is not necessarily the sum of the interests of individuals. In their book, A History of Economic Theory and Method, Ekelund and Hebert provide a well-conceived example to demonstrate this problem. They write:

It is presumably in the general interest of American society to have every automobile in the United States equipped with all possible safety devices. However, a majority of individual car buyers may not be willing to pay the cost of such equipment in the form of higher auto prices. In this case, the collective interest does not coincide with the sum of the individual interests. The result is a legislative and economic dilemma. [9]

Indeed, individuals prone to political action, and held under the sway of utilitarian ethics, will likely be willing to decide in favor of the supposed collective interest over and against that of the individual. But then, what happens to individual human rights? Are they not sacrificed and set aside as unimportant? In fact, this is precisely what has happened. In democratic countries the destruction of human liberty that has taken place in the past hundred years has occurred primarily for this reason. In addition, such thinking largely served as the justification for the mass murders of millions of innocent people in communist countries where the leaders sought to establish the “workers’ paradise.” To put the matter simply, utilitarianism offers no cohesive way to discern between the various factions competing against one another in political debates and thus fails to provide an adequate guide for ethical human action. The failure of utilitarianism at this point is extremely important for a whole host of policy issues. Among them, the issue of the government’s provision of public goods is worth our consideration.

III. Public Goods as Seen Through the Lens of Traditional Morality

It is common practice in teaching the principles of economics today to teach students that one area of market failure occurs when externalities exist. As such, the concept of externalities is presented as the notion that some human action spills over into benefits provided for, or costs imposed upon, third parties. This treatment portrays such spillovers, whether they are positive or negative, as if they were symmetric in nature. That is, a positive externality is merely the flip side of a coin in relation to a negative externality. On this basis, it is then argued that the existence of such externalities leads to an outcome that is less than optimal and that there is, therefore, grounds for government intervention. However, this judgment is fundamentally tied to utilitarianism as will be shown.

Murray Rothbard provided an excellent critique of the mainstream argument, which favors government action to extend positive externalities and provide public goods, in his book, Man, Economy, and State.[10] In his critique, Rothbard points out that the notion of what is optimal in the sense argued by economists at this juncture is value laden. That is, the underlying ethical philosophy that undergirds this conception of what is optimal is utilitarianism. In fact, all welfare economics as it is currently conducted has as a basic assumption, whether it is explicitly stated or not, that the standard of ethical judgments ought to be a hedonistic calculus. In particular, with respect to the argument for government intervention in cases of positive externalities it is argued that such a situation is sub-optimal because a greater level of utility could have been had if these externalities had been extended. This is exactly the kind of hedonistic calculus that Bentham had in mind. But, as has already been shown, such an effort begs numerous questions regarding its legitimacy.

Another point that Rothbard made in his critique is that positive and negative externalities are not symmetric when viewed from a property rights perspective that embraces a more traditional view of ethics. In fact, from this perspective the two are radically different events. In the case of a negative externality, the failure that has taken place is not a failure of the market, but a failure of the governing authority to adequately protect the property rights of all the participants of the market. In this case, issues of pollution are the result of a violation of the property rights of some people by others in order to garner greater benefits. Alternatively, no such violation of property rights can be asserted in the case of positive externalities. Rather, any attempt on the part of government to extend such benefits could only be had by violating the underlying property rights of the person whose actions happen to give rise to external benefits. Nevertheless, as Rothbard pointed out, proponents of government action will invariably attempt to make their case using two lines of attack. First, those who favor government action complain that a person engaged in an activity that benefits others does too little of it. In this case, the proposition put forward is that such gifts to the community are too small.

As an illustration of the weakness of this argument, suppose on Christmas morning a child should awake and venture into the living room of his house to see what presents there might be for him. When he arrives there, he discovers numerous gifts and begins to open them. The joy of the child?s parents will naturally rise in proportion to the child’s delight in receiving the gifts provided. However, if, after the last gift is opened, the child should begin complaining that the bounty he received was far too little, the parents’ joy will quickly sour. Those who argue that government should extend positive externalities, might just as well argue that it also ought to intervene on the behalf of spoiled children everywhere. But this intervention would be utterly absurd. In truth, gifts are just that! They are not deserved, but are extended to others by people of goodwill. And, even if they are extended to others as a chance by-product of someone’s actions, it could hardly be argued that such a gift was too little.

At this point, it might be obvious that the case for state intervention is too weak, but that has not deterred those bent on government action. “The second line of attack is to denounce [the recipient of the external benefits] for accepting a benefit without paying [the provider of it] in return. The recipient is denounced as an ingrate and a virtual thief for accepting the free gift.”[11] Referring back to our example of Christmas morning, it is as if the parents, after all the presents have been unwrapped, should then extend a bill to the child for payment. Or, in an alternative illustration based on the pro-government action argument, it would suggest that because my neighbors enjoy the sight of my yard being well manicured, that I should have a legitimate position on which to tax them to pay my lawn maintenance bills. While such a case is ridiculous, nevertheless, in public debate such arguments are readily offered as a reason why public funds should be expended on education, health care, and a whole host of other so called public goods.

By not realizing that positive and negative externalities are not symmetric, the entire issue of government action is skewed in favor of moving the political economy in the direction of command and control. The final result of such a movement, will tend in the direction of political totalitarianism in which any political group with enough power will seek to gain its benefits by taxing others. Alternatively, recognizing that externalities are asymmetric, will prove to be of tremendous value in sorting through all kinds of difficult cases. For example, suppose that I am the owner of ten thousand acres of land in a rural area and that ten years ago I planted trees on that land with the intention of harvesting them in twenty-five years. Suppose also that someone should buy ten acres of property directly across the road from my land and builds a house for himself on that property. Day after day, my neighbor enjoys the view of the trees on my property. However, when the logging begins, he may very well complain that I am imposing costs upon him by cutting down my trees. Is his argument correct? To be sure, my neighbor is losing something that he has come to value during the years that he has lived in his house. However, my neighbor does not have any legitimate complaint against me. My action simply means that I am no longer going to provide him with the gift of a scenic view. The fact that I had done so for fifteen years does not obligate me to continue to give this gift into perpetuity. The only way that my neighbor could have a legitimate complaint against me, is that I should actually cause damage to his own property in the process of cutting down my trees. In this case, I would need to compensate him for such costs. Whatever the case, by clarifying the issue within the framework of the more sound ethical philosophy of human rights to property, it will be far easier to sort out the underlying issues involved in such disputes. Reliance upon utilitarianism in such cases will only muddy the waters.

Therefore, even if it brings people greater happiness or greater intelligence or does all sorts of great stuff, if it is unethical, it should not be done. Simply put: If a man could rape his daughter and it would magically make everyone smarter, does this mean that make raping his daughter right?

I have already refuted utilitarianism by the article found here: http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=1602 so you should stop appealing to utilitarianism.

If, however, you wish to argue about its utility, you should keep in mind that it is not any justification for unethical actions. It might just happen that the differences in the races is large enough that they should be relegated into different roles according to a hierarchy. This difference could provide good information about groups of people, and might save time by applying the expected value of intelligence to people rather than test each one. However, this is not true. The differences are very small.

Why do blacks have smaller education? It is obviously the subversive black subculture which discourages education. And about the economic development of Africa (low economy=low education), see Guns, Germs and Steel by Jared Diamond.

>>25-32
Way to hijack my thread. Also, LOL @ using Jared Diamond. This guy is a goldmine, because almost every single one of his strange 'anti-racist' (cf. his reviewers, every single one said that it refutes the racist thesis, and some libfags have the nerve to say it's a scientific book) thought-experiments (because they have no basis in reality, he assumes a priori that his theory is correct and attempts to explain 'how it could have happened') backfires. This is why no one takes him seriously in academia, this is why his book won a Pulitzer, and this is why libfags love him. The major book that changed absolutely nothing, hahaha.
Asking OP question again:
1) Is it wrong to discriminate against certain groups, on the sole basis of skin colour (and not race), by cognitive ability? Please explain why your position position is backed by science. Refrain from answering unless you have a minimal understanding of statistics, please.

Stop avoiding it, libfags.

OK OP this is my understanding of your question

you're asking if it's ok to

1)divide people into groups based on skin color

2)figure out how each group ranks on average according to cognitive abilities

3)do.... something

Now I'm not sure about the "something" part. That's why I said your question is imprecise. However upon reflection this line of thinking is typically racist, hence why I called you a stormfront escapee. Science & math has nothing to do with your question, what people decide to do with the ranking in 2) is a moral question.

>>34
you're asking if it's ok to
By OK I mean mathematically/statistically/scientifically accurate. Not morally. P.S. libfag morals suck.
1)divide people into groups based on skin color
Correct. And this is pretty fucking easy.
2)figure out how each group ranks on average according to cognitive abilities
Correct. But we already have this data, due to the thousands of aggregated results.
3)do.... something
Call the libfags on their bullshit. They say that it isn't accurate because "WAAAAAAAAAAH WAAAAAAAAAAAH you can't judge based on skin colour (a straw man of the immense racial differences in h bd)." I can verify it, and so can everyone. But this is a simple question which warrants a simple answer. I gave an example earlier. Feel free to use it if needed.
That's why I said your question is imprecise.
It's very precise. Do something or do nothing, that's not part of the question.
However upon reflection this line of thinking is typically racist, hence why I called you a stormfront escapee.
It's laughable that any person would get insulted by a Communist smear term. I don't care if you call me "racist," nor a Stormfront escapee. However, the latter is false. I'm also a heightist and colourist because I can distinguish between those attributes with my magical superpowers. Go figure. You, on the other hand operate on the "See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil" libfag True Believer mantra. OTHERWISE I CAN'T FUCKING EXPLAIN WHAT'S SO HARD ABOUT ANSWERING A SINGLE QUESTION.
Science & math has nothing to do with your question, what people decide to do with the ranking in 2) is a moral question.
Morality has nothing to do with my question. Morality has to do with your Leftist Church.

35 posts and not a single straight answer. What gives? I will take further swerving as an admission that knowledge and common sense is forbidden and sacrificed on the altar of libfag stupidity when it interferes with the Libfag religion.

you're nuts op heh

>>36
Because asking a simple question is insane amirite?
Is it because the answer is a blatantly obvious 'no, you can do it just fine'?
Or is it because the I let the libfags derail the thread for so long?

>>36
Anyway, trolling religious people by asking them a simple question is utter WIN.

Libfaggotry needs to encounter opposition.  If they recapture the US Congress for even a full 2-year run, they will be INSUFFERABLE.  Count on some SERIOUS gun-grabbing to occur, for instance.

>>38
And in before some shithead libfag says that by trolling implies I am incorrect or not serious, I define trolling as:
An Internet troll, or simply troll in Internet slang, is someone who posts controversial messages in an online community, such as an online discussion forum, with the intention of baiting other users into an emotional response.*

* As per http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troll_%28Internet%29

I'm still waiting for my answers, libfags.