>>21
Too bad you are in one.
Proof, or at least convincing argument please. If it's QM, that can be explained within a computational framework where the 'selection' process is "non-computational". Even if we were in a non-computational universe, we would never be able to make a hypothesis saying so, or even show this. Actually, by virtue of the notion of substitution level, you'd just end up in a computational "universe" anyway. I probably shouldn't talk about this without giving context, so what I'm refering to is
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CC&Q.pdf and
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm .
You try to prove logic with logic
The problem is that if you assume some primitive matter or other weird stuff, you either end up with a very incomplete view that leads to nothing of value (as a theory), or it leads to contradiction, given some assumptions (such as the computationalist or functionalist assumptions, which I take for granted, due to Chalmer's Fading Qualia argument).
How can you think it is the base of things?
A base has to exist. I consider a variety of possible bases and notice that some of them lead to absurdities or contradictions, or is merely as useful as a 'god' hypothesis (not useful at all), computation is the only one that I know that doesn't lead to these problems.
>>22
I might be, I've talked about this before on
/prog/
But, you didn't say it's impossible to "scan for observers", just impossible to find them all? How would one find these observers then, in case computational structures really can have consciousness?
In my example, consciousness is considered the same as truth (let's say arithmetical). By Godel's, we know that there are true, but unprovable sentences. We can, however construct a large amount of provable truths, but there will always be truths which we will never reach by finite proofs.
In a more concrete/practical example, let's say you are trying to identify all conscious humans within the UD and extract them - the process of extraction will be non-halting because the UD itself is non-halting. Not only that, there may be systems which contain hidden observers (for example look
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic_encryption), and we might not obviously find them all (the idea of hidden conscious observer was also explored in the book "Permutation City"). It would be equivalent to solving the halting problem using a computation, but we know that we can't do that (a halting oracle could solve it, but then it wouldn't be able to solve the convergence problem and so on).
On the other hand, if we just assume arithmetical (or equivalent system capable of encoding computations) truth as fundamental, consciousness just finds itself in the relations - it finds its inner mind, the inferred physics, body and so on. Marchal is the originator of this idea and he analyzes it in his works in much more detail than I could do here myself. He even shows that physical supervenience on primary matter (materialism) and computationalism (mind survives digital substitution) are incompatible, and proposes the alternative where consciousness supervene on an infinity of computations (similar to MWI, but much more general) within the UD (thus the actual process of sensing this data instead of that data and being this person instead of that person is non-computational, nor is the selection of the possible future).