So when will the day come,

When programmers aren't needed anymore and we just tell robots to do the programming? If I were you guys I'd be scared for your jobs. If you don't have a job, then these robots would make your existence pointless anyway.

>>40
You make it sound as if going to the parties were something desirable.

>>41
No, being at the parties is something desirable. Going to them can be a bit of a chore.

>>42
Being at a party sounds desirable. What happens there?

>>39
It's the next version of a homie, the avant guarde nigga of yesterday.

>>36
Because Penrose/Hameroff and I share similar 'unpopular' views does not mean we are incorrect, I only have to cite heliocentrism to prove that.

As for breaking down conciousness into two problems I feel you are avoiding the point, how can you be so brazen as to de-construct something into two domains when we have no understanding of the actual domain? Fair enough we have observational data but that leads to us simulating human behaviour(s). If that's what you want, fine, I don't disagree with that.

I held the same opinion as you 10 years ago, after reading shadows of the mind I couldn't get the issue of paramecium out of my head. Also I would suggest you hold off throwing around claims of "human-level intelligence AIs within 50" this makes you sound like a TV scientist. I feel Orch-OR is a step in the right direction, there is something there that we don't understand, research into this area is a good thing.

Although they are not mutually exclusive, there is a difference between 'unpopular' and 'unsubstantiated and stupid.'

>>45
It would be nice/interesting if our brains would be capable of quantum computing of some form, however such claims are lacking evidence, and the evidence that was found seems to indicate the contrary. It is widely believed that our brains are mostly deterministic and we lack "free will"(whatever that is), and most evidence suggests this. Even if we were to assume that quantum computing of some sort was possible in the brain, that still doesn't show that it has anything to do with the way we experience consciousness.

As for the separation of consciousness into 2 problems, let's take an idealized scenario (non-real world scenario, although likely possible in a simulation) where you could know everything about each neuron's state, you would be able to see how the information flows through the system and how the data is "processed". What we perceive as consciousness depends (if not, IS) on the state of some parts of the system ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_correlates_of_consciousness ). However, even if we knew how all the data flowed, and even if we would be able to reconstruct things such as what we see, what we imagine, what we hear, etc (conscious perception), it would still not account for the "hard problem", since we experience things rather continously (even if they are not), and to actually reconstruct such perceptions, we would have to know exactly how each part that plays any role in some perception actually works. The brain is fairly decentralized, and for example processing visual input is done in fairly small chunks with the information being more compressed and centralized as it moves from V1 to V2 To V4 to IT and toward the prefrontal cortex, yet what we experience is fairly continuous and coherent, as we are able to experience the state of the entire system at once (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binding_problem), it may be an illusion, or it may be something else, but all these questions about how "it is to be like something" represent the "hard problem of consciousness", because if you were to inspect the system only by its behaviour, you would see no evidence of this at all... the only reason we even consider the existence of this problem is because that's how we experience the world.

>>43
Drunken women happen at parties.