>>41
That may be true for this particular Universe/multiverse. The class of multiverse that I'm talking about is a bit wider, read the linked paper for a (classical) finitist version or
http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9704009 /
http://arxiv.org/abs/0704.0646 for a more general version (actually, it can be shown that the 2 versions cannot be really distinguished by a finite self-aware substructure (such as ourselves) and one recursively generates the other). In what way is it wider? In your case, you're looking at a structure which allows varying particular constants or individual states, while in my case, I'm looking at the variance of rules/metarules describing the structure in the same way you're looking at the variance of constants/states. I have no reason to assume a particular universal law is the only possible thing.
Either way, there is a way of experimentally testing my hypothesis (read "Permutation City" for an example), but it's outside the realm of popperian scientific falsifiability even if it can be experienced from the first person (by one individual or any number of individuals, however experimenter = experiment and there can not be a third party observer that doesn't participate in the experiment itself, thus this makes it unfalsifiable). It's also the most probable (class of) hypothesis that one can reach given various formalizations of Occam's Razor (such as Solomonoff induction), but as with most inductive processes, some will see it as begging the question - the only way to know is to perform the experiment by yourself when the particular technology exists (same requirements as testing if computationalism is a valid philosophy of mind).