Non-computability.

According to Roger Penrose, humans can perform non-computable feats, such as dealing with Gödel questions. He uses this as a foundation to claim that the human mind cannot be expressed in terms of classical processes, and as such must be party to the only other (known) game in town: Quantum Mechanics.

Now, I haven't had the patience to sit through all of his arguments yet, though I slowly make progress. My understanding is that a large part of his stance is that an algorithm cannot usefully deal with a Gödel question, or equivalently, with the halting problem, while a human can.

My objection to this is that such problems always demand a certain quality of response when asked of UTMs: failing to respond forever is not acceptable as correct, nor is providing any response other than one that yields a truth when taken in combination with the question. This much is fine, however, when it is time for the human to answer, he is permitted the liberty of rejecting the question on the grounds that it is inherently unanswerable.

Obviously I am interested in artificial intelligence, and also find his assertion to be simply a self-serving one with a contrived philosophical backdrop for foundation. If anyone knows of, or can think of, a more sophisticated argument than the one above (or expose my flaws in my assessment of it) I would like to hear it.

Apologies for bringing up a largely philosophical question, my only excuse is that I cannot trust any other board with the question.

>>55
He could almost be excused; AI research at the time was very naive.

His mistake was when he want on to say that a mind cannot simply be a product of computational processes ("dependent on actual physical-chemical properties of actual human brains.") Here he differs from Penrose in that he doesn't try to show a meaningful difference. Penrose could conceivably be forgiven for making a mistake, but Searle doesn't have that luxury when he simply asserts a difference.

The disturbing part is that while making the distinction between what particular processes are permitted (brains are, artificial computational devices are not) to create this higher-order phenomenon (the mind), he accuses those who think otherwise of dualism. Let that sink in.

There are other serious issues, but this is the worst by far. The others I am happy to agree are mistakes worth debating. As for this problem, I can only agree that the man should be ashamed.