Non-computability.

According to Roger Penrose, humans can perform non-computable feats, such as dealing with Gödel questions. He uses this as a foundation to claim that the human mind cannot be expressed in terms of classical processes, and as such must be party to the only other (known) game in town: Quantum Mechanics.

Now, I haven't had the patience to sit through all of his arguments yet, though I slowly make progress. My understanding is that a large part of his stance is that an algorithm cannot usefully deal with a Gödel question, or equivalently, with the halting problem, while a human can.

My objection to this is that such problems always demand a certain quality of response when asked of UTMs: failing to respond forever is not acceptable as correct, nor is providing any response other than one that yields a truth when taken in combination with the question. This much is fine, however, when it is time for the human to answer, he is permitted the liberty of rejecting the question on the grounds that it is inherently unanswerable.

Obviously I am interested in artificial intelligence, and also find his assertion to be simply a self-serving one with a contrived philosophical backdrop for foundation. If anyone knows of, or can think of, a more sophisticated argument than the one above (or expose my flaws in my assessment of it) I would like to hear it.

Apologies for bringing up a largely philosophical question, my only excuse is that I cannot trust any other board with the question.

>>49
The original question, I think, was one of the following:
1."is Penrose a quack or a genius?"
2."can an UTM solve the halting problem?"
3."does being able to stop trying to solve the halting problem for any given reason mean that the human mind can not be emulated on a TM?"
Not quite, but at least now I know you're referring to >>1

The phrasing of (1) could perhaps be radically altered to reflect the original question. Insofar as the "silly" argument is concerned: it serves to change the argument between those who would assert that the halting problem has a solution and those who do not. Otherwise, it's not of any grave importance because there are other means of demonstrating that the halting problem cannot be solved.

>>51
Quantum Mechanics is computable. Your argument is invalid.
No one here has made any argument that requires QM to be non-computable. Penrose has, but he is presumably absent: who are you addressing?

On the other hand, QM has not been shown to be computable. Our current understanding of it suggests that it is not.