Non-computability.

According to Roger Penrose, humans can perform non-computable feats, such as dealing with Gödel questions. He uses this as a foundation to claim that the human mind cannot be expressed in terms of classical processes, and as such must be party to the only other (known) game in town: Quantum Mechanics.

Now, I haven't had the patience to sit through all of his arguments yet, though I slowly make progress. My understanding is that a large part of his stance is that an algorithm cannot usefully deal with a Gödel question, or equivalently, with the halting problem, while a human can.

My objection to this is that such problems always demand a certain quality of response when asked of UTMs: failing to respond forever is not acceptable as correct, nor is providing any response other than one that yields a truth when taken in combination with the question. This much is fine, however, when it is time for the human to answer, he is permitted the liberty of rejecting the question on the grounds that it is inherently unanswerable.

Obviously I am interested in artificial intelligence, and also find his assertion to be simply a self-serving one with a contrived philosophical backdrop for foundation. If anyone knows of, or can think of, a more sophisticated argument than the one above (or expose my flaws in my assessment of it) I would like to hear it.

Apologies for bringing up a largely philosophical question, my only excuse is that I cannot trust any other board with the question.

>>16
This will always give us a result in finite time (an inductive proof of this is left as an exercise for the reader, chiefly that the number of unvisited states must be strictly lower at every step of the program and thus must eventually be exhausted.)

Per >>22 I would like to point out that there is always a problem in any scenario of finite resources to which this method cannot be successfully employed, even if it were correct. The fact is your procedure still falls apart completely when the candidate is asked to analyze itself, as previously illustrated.

In regards to >>17 I must point out that this is a case of 'good enough' isn't. If it works for you and maintains an acceptable quality of life such that you are not bothered by any inaccuracies, good on you, but it doesn't solve the halting problem. >>18 is relevant here, and I would like to add that addressing one instance or any limited collection of instances is not a solution. A solution addresses every possible instance with 100% consistency. (The probable finite nature of the universe notwithstanding, it must also address the infinite cases but I'm letting that one go.)

>>19
I get this every time I bring up Penrose. The issue isn't that there is something wrong with him--it's that there is something wrong with his argument. However, he's far better at both math and physics than I am and I'm just trying to exhaust his arguments until I am beyond 100% certain that the rabbit he's trying to pull from a hat is actually located some distance up his bottom.

(Actually, I do like Penrose. He's got some very takes on things. His hunt for quantum entanglement in the brain is obviously ill-founded, though, even if he's right about the non-computability bit.)

At this point I would like to apologize to >>5 who has taken issue with 'my' gay, for not being more clear up front. It is not that this topic can be expected to escape degenerating into a steaming shitfest on any board, but just look at the glorious shitfest that /prog/ has made of it. You will not find its particular likeness wrought of the same stuff on any other board.